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Supreme Court Extends Escobedo--Mirandav.
Arizona, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966). In a sweeping opinion written in four consolidated cases, the Supreme
Court of the United States has widely extended the
Escobedo rule. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, writing
for a five man majority, held that current interrogation techniques are designed to obtain confessions by reliance on ignorance of the rule against
self-incrimination and that the "inherent compulsion" of stationhouse interrogation can only be
overcome if, "when the individual is first subjected
to police interrogation while in custody at the
station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any way," he is told that he need not
speak, that anything he says may be used against
him in a criminal case, and that he has a right to
consult with counsel before and during interrogation.
The right to counsel also extends to indigent
prisoners, who must be offered the service of free
counsel prior to interrogation if they so desire.
These rights may be waived, said the Court, but
only by an explicit statement to that affect by the
defendant. A confession which merely follows; the
warnings does not, by itself, indicate waiver.
The rules are applicable to all statements,
whether deemed confessions or admissions, and
whether denominated exculpatory or inculpatory.
And no amount of evidence that the defendant was
aware of his rights will substitute for proof of
police warnings.
In a later decision, Johnson v. New Jersey, 86
S.Ct. 1772 (1966), the Court also held that the
Mirandaruling would apply only to cases in which
the trial began after June 13, 1966 and that the
Escobedo rule is applicable only to cases in which
the trial began after June 24, 1964. Thus, the benefits of the rule do not apply to any pending appeals
or litigated cases, whether the relief is requested
by way of direct or collateral attack upon a conviction.

Delay Between Arrest and Reindictment Not
Fatal-UnitedStates v. .Ewell, 86 S. Ct. 773 (1966).
Defendants were convicted of selling narcotics
without an order form under 26 U.S.C. §4705(a).
After pleas of guilty, they were sentenced to minimum terms. Several months later, the Court of
Appeals held, in another case, that the indictment
forms used in these kinds of cases was improper.
The defendants applied for collateral relief which
was granted approximately a year after their
original convictions. The defendants were then
immediately rearrested on new complaints and
subsequently reindicted. The indictments this
time charged not only the original §4705(a) violation, but also violations of §26 U.S.C. 4704(a)
and 21 U.S.C. §174.
The defendants then filed motions to dismiss
the indictments on the ground that their right to a
speedy trial under the sixth amendment had been
violated. The motions were granted. On a petition
for rehearing, the government said that upon a
plea or finding of guilty, all counts of the indictment except that charging a violation of §4704(a)
would be dropped, leaving the defendants to face
minimum sentences less than those which had
been imposed after their original convictions under
§4705(a). Rehearing was denied by the district
judge and the government appealed that portion
of the order dismissing the count charging a
§4704(a) violation. The Supreme Court of the
United States reversed and remanded the indictment for trial.
The Court first rejected the defendants' argument that a nineteen month delay between the
original arrests and the hearings on the reindictments constituted a violation of the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial. "In large measure,"
the Court said, "because of the many procedural
safeguards provided for an accused, the ordinary
procedures for criminal prosecution are designed
to move at a deliberate pace. A requirement of

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES

unreasonable speed would have a deleterious effect
both upon the rights of the accused and upon the
ability of society to protect itself." In this case,
the Court held, since the defendants were promptly
indicted and convicted after their original arrests
and were immediately arrested and reindicted
after their original convictions had been set aside
on their motion, the nineteen month period,
"does not in itself violate the speedy trial provision
of the Constitution."
Moreover, the Court added, drawing upon
analogous cases decided under the double jeopardy
clause, it "has long been the rule that when a defendant obtains a reversal of a prior, unsatisfied
conviction, he may be retried in the normal course
of events." The policies underlying retrial ("the
societal interest in trying people accused of crime,
rather than granting them immunization because
of legal error at a previous trial, and because it
enhances the probability that appellate courts will
be vigilant to strike down previous convictions
that are tainted with reversible error"), the Court
held, would be "seriously undercut by the interpretation given the Speedy Trial Clause by the
court below... [and] such an interpretation would
place a premium upon collateral rather than upon
direct attack because of the greater possibility
that immunization might attach."
The Court then considered the defendants'
argument that new trials were barred because the
government was seeking to proceed upon a new
charge and "the passage of time has allegedly impaired their ability to defend themselves on this
new and different charge .... " In rejecting this
argument, too, the Court noted that the reindictment was brought within the statute of limitations
"which usually is considered the primary guarantee
against bringing overly stale criminal charges"
and, moreover, "the indictments and convictions
of 1962 might well have enhanced appellees' ability
to defend themselves, for they were at the very
least put on early notice that the Government intended to prosecute them for the specific sales with
which they were then and are now charged." And,
the Court added, the defendants had put forth no
specific claims of prejudice; the new charge was
based upon the same facts as the old, and "the
problem of delay is the Government's too, for it
still carries the burden of proving the charges beyond a reasonable doubt."
Spot Checks for Drivers' Licenses Upheld-

Mincy v. District of Columbia, 218 A.2d 507
(D.C.Ct.App.1966). Convicted of driving with a
revoked license, defendant appealed on the ground
that his arrest, which revealed the fact of operating
a motor vehicle without a valid permit, was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals held to the
contrary and affirmed.
Defendant had been driving his automobile in
the District about midnight when he halted for a
traffic light. A policeman on foot approached the
car, tapped on the window and told defendant to
pull over to the curb. Asked for his license and car
registration papers, defendant produced the registration, but could not produce a license, and finally
admitted to the officer that it had been revoked.
Defendant was arrested and taken to the police
station where he was charged.
At the trial the officer testified that he did not
stop defendant for improper driving; that he was
merely making a "spot check" for a driver's license
and that it was his habit to make five or six such
checks while on his tour of duty. He further testified that while he had not been directed by the
department to make such checks he was usually
asked by the officer in charge of the precinct how
many he had made on his current tour.
Defendant argued that when the officer requested him to pull to the curb he was put under
arrest, and since the officer had no probable cause
for an arrest at the time, the discovery of his
failure to have a valid license was the product of
unlawful action and the evidence, together with his
subsequent admission, should be suppressed.
In rejecting this claim, the court pointed out
that the law in the District provided that persons
operating motor vehicles must have, in their possession, a valid license and that they must "exhibit
such permit to any police officer when demand is
made therefore." In denying that the defendant
had been put under "arrest" when the demand
was made in this case, the court said:
"The officer's stopping of appellant to ascertain whether he possessed a valid permit was a
'routine interrogation' and was not an arrest.
***Enforcement of this law, and many other
laws and regulations, can be accomplished only
by routine investigation and interrogation. In
some jurisdictions road-blocks have been set up
and all passing motorists required to stop and
exhibit their permits. Surely no one would say
that such a motorist who is stopped, exhibits his
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permit and then is allowed to proceed, has been
arrested.
A routine spot check of a motorist to ascertain
if he has complied with the requirement of
possession of a permit is neither unreasonable nor
invalid, provided such check is not used as a
substitute for a search for evidence of some
possible crime unrelated to possession of a
driver's permit."
Search At Police Station After Arrest Permissible-Dolan v. State, 185 So. 2d 185 (Dist.
Ct. App., Fla. 1966). Convicted of forgery and
unlawful use of a credit card, defendant appealed
on the ground that the search of his person at the
police station following his arrest was unlawful, and
that the credit card revealed by the search should
not have been allowed in evidence. The District
Court of Appeal held the search lawful and affirmed the convictions.
Defendant was arrested, on a warrant, in the
city of Miami Beach and frisked for weapons.
Finding none, the police took him to the station
where he was booked and again searched. He
alleged that this second search was unlawful since
it was made without warrant and was too remote,
in time and place, from the place of arrest to
properly be classed as a search incident to arrest.
In rejecting this argument, the court said:
"The apprehension and delivery of the defendant to the police station for detention was
all a part of the arresting process. The search
was not remote as to time or place with respect
to the arrest. A second search of an arrested
party, in the course of arresting or securing him,
is not in violation of law."
Comment: For a seemingly contrary result on
similar facts, see People v. Bowen, 194 N.E. 2d
316 (Il. 1963).
Indigence And Bail Pending Appeal-McCoy v.
United States, 357 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Convicted of unauthorized use of an automobile and
contempt of court, defendant appealed. Pending
appeal, he asked that bail be fixed and bail was
subsequently set at $1000, an amount later reduced to $500. After counsel was appointed, a
motion was made for release on personal recognizance on the ground that although the bail
premium was only $40, no bondsman would write
the bond because defendant had already begun
serving his sentence. Counsel alleged:

"The reason given by the bondsmen is that
once a man has actually served some of his time
in prison and is released on bond, he will, if his
appeal is unsuccessful, flee the jurisdiction
rather than return to finish serving his sentence."
The Court of Appeals found that defendant was
a good risk for bail and that it "would be manifestly unjust to permit professional bondsmen to
'hold the keys to the jail in their pockets,' when
their refusal to write a bond is due to the fact that
the appellant has begun serving his sentence."
The court thereupon entered an order allowing the
defendant to execute a personal bond in the amount
of $500 to be signed by two close relatives who
were residents of the District, on the further conditions that he reside with a member of his family
and report to the probation officer of the District.
'We think it appropriate," said the court, "for
the courts to avail themselves of their flexibility
to vary terms and conditions as well as amounts of,
bail, and provide substitutes, in the case of indigent defendants, for conventional bonds of professional bondsmen."
In dissent, Judge Burger indicated his belief
that the question of release on personal recognizance should first be explored by the District
Court, but added that he agreed "with judge
Leventhal's approach to the need for experimenting
with various devices for release on personal assurances to the end that more discriminating release
procedures can be developed."
Evidence Seized Following Stop And Frisk
Admissible-State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114 (Ct.
App., Ohio 1966). Defendant was convicted of
possessing a concealed weapon. He appealed on the
ground that the weapon had been seized in a
search following an unconstitutional arrest and
should therefore have been suppressed at the
trial. The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County
held the seizure to be reasonable and affirmed.
The arresting officer testified that the conduct
of the defendant and a companion had attracted
his attention because, while standing on a street
corner, one would walk down the street to look in
the window of a jewelry store or airline office as
the other waited on the comer. After the procedure
was repeated two to five times, and the two conversed briefly with a third person, the detective, of
the belief that they were "casing" the stores, approached the men, identified himself and asked for
their names. "Receiving only a mumbled response,
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the detective turned the defendant around, quickly
patted down the outside of his clothing, and,
perceiving a hard object in the inner breast pocket
of his topcoat, inserted his hand and removed a
fully loaded automatic."
At this point, the three were taken into custody
and a similar frisk and search revealed another
weapon on the person of the co-defendant. The
third man had no gun.
Defendant claimed that he had been arrested
without probable cause when the detective stopped
him for questioning, that the frisk and search
which revealed the existence of the weapon was
not incident to a lawful arrest, and that the gun
should have been suppressed.
In affirming the conviction, the court held that
the police officer had the right, because of the
suspicious circumstances, to stop and question the
defendant; that no arrest took place at that time;
that the officer was entitled to "frisk" to protect
himself from attack; that finding a hard object, he
was entitled to search and that no arrest took
place until after the gun had been discovered. The
court said:
"... the better view seems to be that the
stopping and questioning of suspicious persons
is not prohibited by the Constitution. *** An
individual who acts in a suspicious manner
invites a preliminary inquiry by the proper
authority. It does not unreasonably invade the
individual's right to privacy to hold that the
price of indulgence in suspicious behavior is a
policeinquiry. *** Such a minor interference with
personal liberty would 'touch the right of
privacy only to serve it well.' *** If such questioning failed to reveal probable cause, it would
thereby forestall invalid arrests of innocent
persons on inadequate cause and the attendant
invasion of personal liberty and reputation. If
it revealed probable cause, it would do no more
than open the way to a valid arrest. The business
of the police is not only to solve crimes after
they occur, but to prevent them from taking
place whenever it is legally possible.***
Having determined that the police officer
could validly inquire into the activities of the
defendant, then it follows that the officer ought
to be allowed to 'frisk,' under some circumstances at least, to insure that the suspect does
not possess a dangerous weapon which would put
the safety of the officer in peril. *** What is the
officer to do in this situation? Are we to allow

him the right of inquiry and then, when this
right is exercised, reward him with an assailant's
bullet? The practice of 'frisking' is well accepted
in police practice, and police officers seem
unanimous in stating that 'frisking' is done for
self-protection and not as a mere evidentiary
'fishing expedition.'"
The court also said that even if the Supreme
Court of the United States were to hold that
federal law enforcement officials could not "stop
and frisk" under such circumstances, the latitude
allowed the states under the rule of Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), saved the procedure
here since the "necessities of law enforcement in
large urban areas require the procedures utilized
in the iustant case."
Moreover, the court said, even if the stop and
frisk here was unreasonable, the evfdence should
not be excluded since the purpose of the exclusionary rule-to deter unlawful police conduct in
a search for evidence-would not be served. "A
judicial rule rendering evidence produced as the
result of a 'frisk' inadmissible would fail to deter
the police from 'frisking' suspects believed to be
armed," the court reasoned, "as police 'frisk' for
their own protection rather than for the purpose
of looking for evidence."
Proper Identification of Ballistics EvidencePeople v. Dilworth, 214 N.E. 2d 9 (Ill. App. 1966).
Sentenced to the penitentiary following his conviction for murder, defendant raised as error the
use of a bullet taken from the body of his victim.
The appellate court held that the handling and
identification of the slug raised no questions concerning the propriety of its use as an exhibit and
affirmed.
The coroner testified that he removed a bullet
"similar" to the one offered in evidence from the
body of the victim and took it to the police station
and gave it to a detective. That detective testified
that he received the same slug from the doctor and
passed it to another detective. That officer put
no mark on the bullet "as he was afraid such a
mark might impair ballistics examination, and...
he sent this slug in an identified or labeled box to
the F.B.I. laboratory."
In objecting to the use in evidence of the bullet,
defendant argued that "because no identification
mark was placed on this slug, and because the
F.B.I. personnel, receiving the slug in the labeled
box, examining it, and then returning it to the box
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and mailing it back to the Galesburg police, did
not testify, there was a failure of proper identification, and lack of proof of continuity of possession."
In upholding the propriety of the handling involved, the court found that it would not have
been "feasible" to mark the bullet and that the
testimony of the police officers and the coroner
provided a sufficient foundation, especially in view
of the fact that the subject bullet was of the same
caliber as other bullets and a gun taken from the
defendant by the police.
Expert's Qualifications In Narcotic CasesState v. Garcia, 413 P.2d 210 (N.M. 1966). Convicted of possession of marijuana, defendant complained on appeal that the expert presented by the
state to testify to the narcotic quality of the substance possessed should not have been allowed to
testify because he had no degree in chemistry.
Affirming the conviction, the court said:
"[The witness] did have a B.S. degree in
chemical engineering; had six years of experience
working in a laboratory analyzing substances
for chemical content, and had examined between
six hundred and eight hundred specimens to
determine if they contained marijuana. It is
the trial judge's responsibility to determine
whether an offered expert is sufficiently qualified
to testify in a cause... [and we] see no abuse of
discretion here."
Seizure Of Clothing After Arrest Is Reasonable
-United States v. Caruso, 358 F. 2d 184 (2d Cir.
1966). The defendant, convicted of bank robbery,
appealed on the ground, inter alia, that the seizure
of his clothing six hours after his arrest was unreasonable and that its use as evidence should not
have been permitted. The Court of Appeals rejected this contention and affirmed the conviction.
Citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364
(1964) (in which the Supreme Court held unreasonable the search of an automobile at police headquarters after its occupants had been committed
to jail), defendant argued that the time lapse of
six hours between his initial arrest and the final
seizure of his clothing removed the seizure here
from the category of search incident to arrest.
Answering this argument, the court said:
"Here the clothes were constantly in sight
[from the time of arrest], were taken on the
person of the suspect at the time of arrest and
were continuously in custody. The appellant's

contention means that the seizure of his clothing
could have been made constitutionally only if,
immediately on his arrest, he had been stripped
to the buff on the public highway. Even though
that April 13th may have been a very pleasant
spring day, we are of the opinion that the argument is somewhat extreme."
Comment: A similar result has also been reached
by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v.
Mark, 216 A.2d 377 (N.J. 196). There the defendant was arrested and taken to the county jail.
Sometime later his clothing was removed and
delivered to the trooper who had made the original
arrest in defendant's rented room. The New
Jersey court said:
"The taking of the clothing and the examination of the trousers for bloodstains were clearly
proper police procedures and were neither unreasonable nor violative of any of the defendant's
constitutional rights. ***As the facts before us
well illustrate, it would make no sense to insist
that a defendant's clothes be removed immediately at the time of his arrest though facilities
are not available, rather than after his delivery
to jail where facilities are available. If we are
to view the matter in terms of reasonableness
and practicability, as everyone seems to concede,
the removal here of the defendant's clothing at
the... jail for examination was dearly lawful.
Nothing in Preston v. United States, supra,
suggests an intent to carry over an inflexible
requirement of contemporaneity to this readily
distinguishable type of situation involving internal prison routine and supervision."
Pre-trial Statements Of Witness Not Available
For Impeachment-Noel v. State, 215 N.E.2d
539 (Ind.1966). Appealing a conviction for enticing
a female into an immoral place, defendant claimed
as error the refusal of the trial judge to allow him
to receive from the state, and use for impeachment
purposes, a statement given by the complaining
witness to a deputy sheriff prior to trial. The
Supreme Court of Indiana upheld the trial court's
refusal and affirmed the conviction.
In denying what has become routine discovery
in other states, the Supreme Court of Indiana held,
first, that the federal cases allowing such relief
(e.g., Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657) laid
down no constitutional mandate and were not,
therefore, binding upon the state courts. Secondly,
the court said, if the relief requested here was to
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be granted "there would be logic in the same rule
applying to any witness which the defendant may
produce... [but this] rule would not apply to a
defendant himself unless he took the stand and
waived his constitutional immunity against selfincrimination." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the
court said, adoption of such a rule would inevitably
lead to demands that the state and defendant be
entitled to learn the names of witnesses prior to
trial and that grand jury investigations be opened
to discovery. Lazy lawyers, said the court, would
take advantage of the diligence shown in pre-trial
investigations by industrious lawyers. Finally, the
court noted, adoption of such a rule would constitute a "serious" departure from a "centuries"
old rule.
Impeachment by Evidence Of Prior Conviction
-State v. Hawthorne, 218 A.2d 430 (Cnty. Ct.,
N.J. 1966). Defendant was indicted for assault and
battery, and, fearing that at his forthcoming trial
the prosecution would, should he take the stand
attempt to impeach him by introducing evidence
of his prior convictions, he filed a motion asking
the trial judge to suppress the convictions as evidence. The motion was granted.
The petition alleged that the defendant had
previously been convicted in 1945 of auto larceny
and armed robbery, and in 1956 of robbery. Although the applicable statute provided that
previous convictions of crime "may be shown by
examination or otherwise," and although the
appellate court had previously held that the state
"has the unquestioned right to prove prior convictions of misdemeanors and high misdemeanors
to affect a defendant's credibility, and may inquire
of him to that end" (State v. Jones, 154A. 2d (640),
the trial court in this case concluded that the word
"may," in both the statute and appellate court
opinion, indicated not a right on the part of the
state, but a discretion on the part of the trial court,
since to "permit a prosecutor to use a prior conviction as a matter of right in every case is fundamentally unfair."
The court then concluded that all of the prior
convictions were not only remote in point of time,
but if "the prior convictions were permitted in
evidence to affect [the defendant's] credibility
the jury could well conclude that the defendant
is habitually involved in crimes-this despite a
cautionary charge." The probative value of the
prior convictions for the purpose of impeachment,
the court said, was outweighed by the danger of

prejudice to the defendant, and the convictions
were therefore suppressed as impeaching evidence.
Amnesia Not Grounds For Postponement Of
Trial-Commonwealth v. Price, 218 A.2d 758 (Pa.
1966). Indicted for murder, defendant filed a pretrial petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging
that he had suffered a permanent loss of memory
concerning events before, during and after the
homicide. He requested that he be discharged from
custody and the indictment dismissed, or, alternatively, that the trial be continued until he had
recovered his memory and that, meanwhile, he be
admitted to bail. Relief was denied, the petition
was dismissed, and defendant appealed to the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which affirmed
the order of the lower court.
The deceased was found in defendant's car with
a gunshot wound in the head. Defendant was
found some 100 feet away and he also had sustained
a gunshot wound in the head. Although he claimed
a total loss of recall concerning these events, it
was stipulated that he was then, and at the time
of the hearing on the petition, completely sane and
competent. Although the medical experts were
unable to say that defendant was feigning loss of
memory, only two out of the five who testified expressed the opinion that the loss of memory was
permanent.
The Supreme Court said that although "for
over 100 years, lack of memory in murder cases
has been a common and frequent defense ...when

carefully analyzed, amnesia actually is no defense
at all and the statement in four prior decisions of
this Court that it is an affirmative defense is too
broad and is hereby disavowed." Since amnesia
"does not absolve or exculpate the defendant from
any of his criminal acts or from total criminal
responsibility," the court said, "[it] is not admissible to prove guilt or innocence... [but is
merely] a circumstance which the Judge or the
jury may consider in determining the penalty,
if they believe it to exist."
The court also held that defendant was not entitled to a continuance of the trial since a defendant incompetent to stand trial must be one
who is insane or mentally ill. "This defendant,"
said the court, "is able to comprehend his position
as one accused of murder, is fully capable of understanding the gravity of the criminal proceedings
against him, and is as able to cooperate with his
counsel in making a rational defense as is any
defendant who alleges that at the time of the

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES

crime he was insane or very intoxicated or completely drugged, or a defendant whose mind
allegedly went blank or who blacked out or who
panicked and contends or testifies that he does not
remember anything."
Recent Cases Defining Probable Cause For
Arrest-People v. Rogers, 50 Cal. Reptr. 559
(D.C.A., Cal. 1966); Richardson v. State, 147
S.E. 2d 653 (C.A.Ga. 1966); People v. Evans,
141 N.W. 2d 668 (C.A. Mich. 1966). In Rogers, a
policeman on routine patrol at 4 a.m. saw defendant getting into his parked car in front of
recently burglarized business establishments. He
asked defendant what he was doing and Rogers
replied that he had just fixed a flat tire. After the
officer asked him where the tire was, defendant
said that he had not had a flat, but that he had
pulled off the road to drink a can of beer. Checking
the defendant's driver's license and registration
papers, the officer noticed cartons and loose packages of candy and cigarettes in the back seat of the
car. After radioing headquarters for assistance,
the officer asked Rogers whether he had ever served
time in the pentitentiary. Rogers replied that he
had previously been convicted of burglary, theft
and robbery. When the other officers arrived on
the scene they found that a nearby bar had been
broken open and its coin machines broken into.
Rogers was then placed under arrest.
In approving the conduct of the arresting officer,
the court in Rogers said:
"'It is well established that a police officer...
may detain and question a person when the circumstances are such as would indicate to a
reasonable man in a like position that such a
course is necessary to the proper discharge of
[his] duties.' *** Most such occurrences involve
persons outdoors at night at times and in areas
where one would not reasonably expect to see
them and whose behavior on the surface suggests
some extraordinary circumstances. *** [While
first seeing Rogers at that time and place] did
not give the officer probable cause to make an
arrest, it did permit him to question Rogers
and to investigate what was going on. *** [The
contradictory answers and what he saw in the
rear seat] properly aroused the officer's suspicion
that a crime had been committed and justified
him in detaining Rogers until other officers
arrived and an investigation of the neighboring
premises could be made. On such investigation
the... burglary was discovered. Probable cause

then existed for Rogers' arrest and for the
search of his vehicle incident to his arrest."
In Richardson, two county policemen on patrol
in the middle of the night, about seven miles from
a town where, unknown to them, a burglary had
just taken place, saw defendant approaching their
car with a seamen's sack slung over his shoulder.
After passing defendant and proceeding for about
two hundred yards, the police turned their car
around and pulled up alongside defendant with the
intention of questioning him. As they pulled up to
him, defendant attempted to flee across a field,
but, when the officers prepared to give chase,. he
stopped. Although they knew of several recent
burglaries in the area they had no knowledge of
the one defendant had in fact committed. Nevertheless, they seized the defendant's bag and, after
ascertaining its contents (two pocket watches,
1,000 pennies, 11 pairs of pants, a rifle, pistol and
a necklace) placed him under arrest.
In upholding the validity of the arrest, the court
said that although none of the facts known to the
officers before defendant's seizure would alone or
together constitute probable cause for arrest, the
factor of flight was sufficient to tip the scales.
"The particular circumstances here, added
together, make a very strong case for suspicion,
and a weak but adequate one for probable cause
to suspect that a felony had been committed by
the defendant." (Emphasis added.)
In Evans, two police officers on patrol at about
4:45 a.m. saw defendant walking at a rapid pace
carrying a package. He turned a comer and disappeared from their sight. Their curiosity aroused,
the officers turned their squad car around and
went to the intersection where they had last seen
the defendant. He was not there, but when the
officers proceeded down a nearby alley they found
the defendant crouched behind a garbage can,
holding the package in his hand. The officers told
him to place the package down and to raise his
hands. They then searched him and found a full
fifth of whisky, another partially filled fifth capped
by a metal pouring spout and 18 nickels.
In the package, the police found three partially
filled fifth bottles of liquor. Each bottle was capped
by the same kind of spout. The defendant claimed
that he had bought the liquor from a "dark-looking
fellow for $6.30 and that he had paid the man in
nickels."
After placing defendant in the squad car, the
officers conducted a search of nearby liquor establishments to determine if there had been any
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break-ins. They found none. At this time, they
had no knowledge of any complaints or other information which revealed any burglaries in that
vicinity. They then took the defendant to the
police station for "investigation." Two days later
he was charged with burglary and larceny.
At his trial defendant contended that his arrest
was illegal and that evidence of the liquid should
have been suppressed. In response to this argument, the Court of Appeals said:
"This Court makes no decision as to the
existence of reasonable grounds for arrest of the
defendant before he was searched. In Michigan,
the validity of search and seizure without a
warrant is not dependent upon a prior valid
arrest. ***The test is whether or not under all
the circumstances, the search and seizure is
reasonable. *** [The] cases seem to be based
upon the theory that when a person, upon discovering that he is being observed by the police,
takes obviously evasive action, he gives the
police reasonable cause to believe that he is
committing or has committed a felony or is in
the process of committing a misdemeanor,
thereby justifying immediate search and seizure.
This Court concludes, therefore, that the defendant Evans, by evading and hiding from the
police, gave them sufficient reason to make immediate search and seizure."
No Bail For Narcotics Defendant Pending
Government Appeal Of Suppression OrderUnited States v. Lianes, 357 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966).
Defendant moved to suppress as evidence narcotics
taken from his person following his arrest by
federal agents. The District judge, while indicating
that he believed the testimony of the agents, held
that the facts to which they testified did not
establish probable cause, granted the motion, and
released defendant on his own recognizance. After
referring the matter to "Washington," the United
States Attorney's office for the Southern District
of New York appea ed the order of suppression
and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed.
Disagreeing with the District Judge, the appellate court found that probable cause was made
out by the agents' testimony. And though the court
found the District judge believed the agents'
testimony, it said that because there was some
confusion about this matter, "it would be the
better practice to make... findings when, as
here, one party seeks them and it is apparent

that an appeal may be taken," even though, as
the court recognized, "district court judges are not
required to make findings on a hearing to suppress
evidence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e) ....
" (Emphasis added.)
Moreover, the court said, release of the defendant on his own recognizance was improper.
Since the act which allows the government to
appeal motions to suppress which are granted in
narcotics cases provides that the appeal must be
taken in 30 days and prosecuted "diligently," and
contains no express provision for release of the
defendant upon his own recognizance, the court
held, "the government was remiss in not having
sought a stay from this court pending an expedited
appeal."
"Moreover," the court said, "there is every
reason why appeals from orders suppressing
evidence in narcotics cases should be expedited.
Failure of the government to seek review
promptly may well merit dismissal in the absence of good reason for delay. And, in the
future, we will look with increasing skepticism
upon the justification suggested here for lack of
expedition-the necessity to refer the matter to
Washington."
Evidence Taken In Police Station Inventory
Admissible-People v. Rogers, 50 Cal. Reptr. 559
(D.C.A., Cal. 1966). Defendant, convicted of
burglary, appealed on the ground that a set of
keys, taken from him at the police station following
his arrest, were unlawfully seized and should have
been suppressed prior to trial. The District Court
of Appeals held the seizure lawful and affirmed
the conviction.
The defendant had been arrested near the
burglarized premises, at which time his car was
searched. Following his arrest, he was taken to the
police station where his personal possessions were
taken from him. Some were put into an evidence
locker, and the remainder, including a set of keys,
were put in a "personal property locker." The
defendant was later, with his possessions and the
evidence, turned over to the custody of the sheriff.
Following his transfer to the custody of the
sheriff, a detective investigating the burglary obtained the set of keys and fit them in the locks of
the burglarized premises. Employees of the
premises then identified the keys as belonging to
the establishment.
Defendant contended that the keys were inadmissible since they had been taken from the
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custody of the sheriff without the use of a search
warrant. In rejecting this argument, the court
noted that the keys had been taken from Rogers
at the time of his booking and a "search of an
arrested person at the time of his booking has
always been considered contemporaneous to his
arrest and is a reasonable search. *** Once articles
have lawfully fallen into the hands of the police
they may examine them to see if they have been
stolen, test them to see if they have been used in
the commission of a crime, return them to the
prisoner on his release, or preserve them for use
as evidence at the trial. *** During their period
of police custody an arrested person's personal
effects, like his person itself, are subject to reasonable inspection, examination and test."
Moreover, the court noted, since the keys did
not belong to defendant and, indeed, were stolen
property, he could not complain about their subsequent use by the police.
Results of Urinalysis Test Properly AdmittedBungardeanuv. England, 219 A.2d 104 (D.C.C.A.
1966). The petitioner appealed from a decision of
the Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles
revoking his driver's license and argued, inter alia
that the results of a urinalysis test should not have
been admitted into evidence against him at the
hearing. The court held the evidence admissible
and affirmed.
Petitioner contended that the results of the test
were inadmissible because "the urine specimen did
not necessarily show its alcoholic content at the
time that he was operating his automobile since
it was given more than an hour later and was not
analyzed until the next morning."
In rejecting this argument, the court held
that "'the very nature of this specimen made
improbable any change in it which would have
disadvantaged defendant short of deliberated
tampering with the bottle.' And it seems to us
that the specimen was given in close enough
proximity to the events in question to provide
an accurate indication of the alcohol in petitioner's system at that time. Any delay would
have been to his advantage."
Trial Judge's Remarks To Death Qualified
Jury Error-Coley v. State, 185 So. 2d 472 (Fla.
1966). Defendant was tried for rape, convicted
and sentenced to death. He appealed on the ground
that the trial judge, during the voir dire examination of the jury, made remarks which constituted

prejudicial error. The Supreme Court of Florida
agreed and reversed the conviction.
During the voir dire, the court asked the potential jurors whether any had conscientious
scruples against the infliction of the death penalty.
Eleven said that they did. The judge then said:
"Well, gentlemen, as I explained, the maximum penalty involved in the charge of rape is
death by electrocution, and the law provides it.
I realize some people don't believe in it, and I
also realize that some of those people that say
they don't believe in it, if their little daughter
or their wife was raped, they would believe in it
fast. Or if their wife was murdered, or some of
their family was murdered, they would holler to
high heaven to get them a Courtroom, a Judge
and a Jury."
The state urged that the conviction be affirmed
despite these remarks of the trial court on the
grounds that (1) they were made in response to
feigned opposition to capital punishment on the
part of the veniremen, and (2) they were capable
of the interpretation that if murder befell the
family of a juror he would seek, not death, but
"simply a courtroom, a judge and a jury."
In reversing, the court held that though judges
and lawyers might agree that the remarks were
intended to mean what the state contended they
meant, it was asking too much of lay jurors to
reach the same conclusion. In addition, the court
held, only the latter part of the remarks were subject to the state's interpretation. The vice of the
remarks, the court said, flowed from the first of
them which obviously implied that the judge
believed that a rape had been committed in this
case and that death was the proper punishment.
Wrong Address Does Not Vitiate Search
Warrant-State v. Daniels, 217 A.2d 610 (N.J.
1966). The defendants, indicted for gambling,
moved to suppress as evidence paraphernalia taken
in a search and seizure under the authority of a
search warrant. The trial judge granted the motion
to suppress on the ground that the address of the
premises to be searched differed from that of the
premises actually searched. The Supreme Court
of New Jersey held the difference insubstantial
and reversed.
The affidavit for search warrant subscribed to by
a police officer set out facts which amply showed
probable cause, but the premises to be searched
were described in both the affidavit and warrant
as "a candy store" or "confectionery store"

